Abstract. We introduce two min-max problems: the first problem is to minimize the supremum of finitely many rational functions over a compact basic semi-algebraic set whereas the second problem is a 2-player zero-sum polynomial game in randomized strategies and with compact basic semi-algebraic pure strategy sets. It is proved that their optimal solution can be approximated by solving a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations, in the spirit of the moment approach developed in Lasserre [19, 20] . This provides a unified approach and a class of algorithms to approximate all Nash equilibria and min-max strategies of many static and dynamic games. Each semidefinite relaxation can be solved in time which is polynomial in its input size and practice from global optimization suggests that very often few relaxations are needed for a good approximation (and sometimes even finite convergence). In many cases (e.g. for Nash equilibria) the error of a relaxation can be computed.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with effective computation (or approximation) of Nash equilibria for n-player games. To achieve this goal, we provide a numerical scheme which consists of a hierarchy of semidefinite programs whose associated sequence of optimal values converges (sometimes in finitely many steps) to the value of the game. When the convergence is finite and a sufficient condition is met, one may also compute an optimal strategy.
Background. Nash equilibrium, a central concept in game theory, is a profile of mixed strategies (a strategy for each player) such that each player is best-responding to the strategies of the opponents. To show existence of an equilibrium in randomized (mixed) strategies for n-player finite static games, Nash used Kakutanyi's (resp. Brouwer's) fixed point theorem in [27] (resp. [28] ). Then Glicksberg [12] extended the proof in Nash [27] to compact-continuous euclidean games.
Computing a fixed point of a function is known to be PPAD-complete (the class of all search problems that are guaranteed to exist by means of a direct graph argument, introduced by Papadimitriou [30] ). This may be understood from the fact that Brouwer's is a consequence of Sperner's lemma [38] which in turn can be proved by a direct graph argument (see Border [3] ).
Computing optimal solutions for a 2-player zero-sum finite game reduces to solving a linear program (von-Neumann and Morgenstern [29] ) and so can be done in polynomial time. For a long time it has been thought that the famous LemkeHowson [21] algorithm to compute a Nash-equilibrium for a 2-player non-zerosum finite game is efficient. Even if it has been extended to n-player games in Rosenmüller [36] , the common belief in game theory is that the computational complexity of 2-player games should differ from that of 3-(or more) player games.
In 2001, Papadimitriou [31] wrote "the complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium [of a 2-player game] is the most important concrete open problem on the boundary of P" and he analyzes that "because of the guaranteed existence of a solution, the problem is unlikely to be NP-hard; in fact it belongs to a class of problems between P and NP" (referring to PPAD).
Since then, Savani and von Stengel [37] proved that the Lemke-Howson algorithm may be exponential for 2-player games. Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [5] proved that solving a 4-player game is PPAD-complete and conjectured that for 2-player games, finding a Nash equilibrium may be solved in polynomial time. The later PPAD-completeness result has been extended to 3-player games by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [6] and by Chen and Deng [7] . Unfortunately, Cheng and Deng [8] showed that a similar PPAD-completeness result holds for 2-player games!
The surprising result of Deng and Chen [8] may perhaps be understood from the recent and elegant paper of McLenann and Tourky [24] where it is proved that Kakutanyi may be deduced from 2-player finite imitation games (or from a linear complementarity problem).
An imitation game is a 2-player game where the payoff matrix of player 2 (the imitator) is the identity. The game may be described by an m × m matrix A = (a i,j ) (the payoff function of player 1, the mover). Finding a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a linear complementarity problem [24] : One may prove existence of a solution which can be computed by a simple adaptation of the Lemke-Howson algorithm. So, McLenann and Tourky [24] provided an algorithm that computes approximate fixed points of an upper-hemicontinuous convex and compact correspondence F . Starting from any initial point x 1 , define recursively {x m } and {y m } . Pick y m ∈ F (x m ) arbitrarily and set x m+1 = m j=1 β m j y j where β m is an equilibrium of the imitation game where the payoff of the mover is a i,j = − x i − y j 2 . Accumulation points of {x m } are fixed points for F . A different approach is to view the set of Nash equilibria as the set of real nonnegative solutions to a system of polynomial equations. Methods of computational algebra (e.g. using Gröbner bases) can be applied as suggested and studied in e.g. Dutta [10] , Lipton [22] and Sturmfels [39] . However, observe that in this algebraic approach one first computes all complex solutions to sort out all real nonnegative solutions afterwards.
In the class of polynomial games introduced by Dresher, Karlin and Shapley (1950), the strategy set S i of each player i is a product of compact intervals and the payoff function is polynomial. When the game is zero-sum and S i = [0, 1], Parrilo [32] showed that finding an optimal solution is equivalent to solving a single semidefinite program. Then Shah and Parrilo [34] extended the methodology to discounted zero-sum stochastic games in which the transition is controlled by one player only. Finally, it is worth noticing recent algorithms designed to solve some specific classes of infinite games. For instance, Gürkan and Pang [13] .
Contribution. In a first part we consider the problem P of minimizing the supremum of finitely many rational functions over a compact basic semi-algebraic set. In the spirit of the moment approach developed in Lasserre [19, 20] , we define a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations (in short SDP-relaxations) for which each SDP-relaxation is a SDP that can be solved in polynomial time and the monotone sequence of optimal values associated with the hierarchy converges to the optimal value of P. Sometimes the convergence is finite and a sufficient condition permits to detect whether a certain relaxation in the hierarchy is exact (i.e. provides the optimal value), and to extract optimal solutions. Next, we show that computing the min-max or a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for static games or dynamic absorbing games, reduces to solving problem P mentioned above. We extend Nash's result for finite games to a new class of games that we call Loomis's [23] games and show that finding a Nash equilibrium of a Loomis game also reduces to solving problem P. It is worth emphasizing that when the payoffs are linear then the hierarchy of SDP-relaxations reduces to the first one of the hierarchy, which in turn is a linear program. This is in support of the claim that the above methodology is a natural extension to the non linear case of the well-known LP-approach.
The approach may be used to solve imitation games. Combined with McLennan and Tourky's construction, it provides an algorithm for computing a fixed point of any upper-hemicontinuous convex and compact correspondence hence computing a Nash equilibrium for concave euclidean games [12] .
The approach may also be used to compute minima of team optimization problems in which a continuous function f (x) = f (x 1 , ..., x n ) is to be minimized over a cartesian product of convex-compact sets X = n i=1 X i . The theory of teams is a particular instance of N-player games. Conversely, computing Nash-equilibria may be viewed as a team optimization problem. The team model has been introduced in Marschak [25] and studied by many authors ( [17, 26] ). If the function to minimize is a supremum of finitely many rational functions and the compact sets X i , i = 1, ..., n are basic semi-algebraic sets then this is a particular instance of problem P. If the function is separately convex, one can combine the construction of McLennan and Tourky [24] described above and use our algorithm to solve the associated imitation game, where the correspondence F is defined as in N-player games:
Because f is separately convex, finding a point in F can be done, in principle, efficiently.
In a second part, we consider general 2-player zero-sum polynomial games (whose action sets are basic compact semi-algebraic sets of R n and the payoff function polynomial). We show that the value and optimal strategies can be approximated as closely as desired, again by solving a certain hierarchy of SDP-relaxations. This result is a multivariate extension of Parrilo's [32] result for the univariate case where one needs to solve a single semidefinite program (as opposed to a hierarchy). This approach may be extended to dynamic absorbing games with discounted rewards, and in the univariate case one can construct a polynomial time algorithm that combines a dichotomy on the value of the game with a semidefinite program. Note that in 2-player absorbing dynamic games, transitions are controlled by both players, and so our result extends those in Parrilo and Shah [34] where only one player controls the transition. A natural open question arises: how to adapt the techniques to approximate general non-zero-sum polynomial games? Importantly, and in contrast with numerical algorithms that compute only one equilibrium, our moment approach allows to compute all Nash equilibria of a finite game (when that number is finite) and without computing all complex solutions as in the computational algebra algorithms described in Dutta [10] , Lipton [22] and Sturmfels [39] .
To conclude, if the rather negative computational complexity results ( [37] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] ) have conforted the game theory community with the idea that many game problems are computationally hard, on a more positive tone, our contribution provides a unified semidefinite programming approach to many game problems: it shows that optimal value and strategies can be approximated as closely as desired (and sometimes obtained exactly) by solving a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations, very much in the spirit of the moment approach described in [19] for solving polynomial optimization problems (a particular instance of the generalized problem of moments [20] ). Moreover, the algorithm is consistent with previous results [29] and [32] as it reduces to a linear program for finite zero-sum games and to a single semidefinite program for univariate infinite zero-sum games.
Finally, even if practice in global optimization seems to reveal that this approach is efficient, of course the size of the semidefinite relaxations grows rapidly with the initial problem size. Therefore, in view of the present status of public SDP solvers available, its application is limited to small to medium size problems so far. Two big challenges are to (a) detect in advance which relaxation in the hierarchy solves the problem up to a given tolerance, and (b) when a relaxation is exact, to determine whether its size is polynomial in the input size of the initial problem. These questions seem to be very difficult, maybe in the boundary of P = or not = to NP? With y =: (y α ) ⊂ R being a sequence indexed in the canonical monomial basis
Moment matrix. Given y = (y α ) ⊂ R, the moment matrix M d (y) of order d associated with y, has its rows and columns indexed by (x α ) and its (α, β)-entry is defined by:
Localizing matrix. Similarly, given y = (y α ) ⊂ R and θ ∈ R[x] (= γ θ γ x γ ), the localizing matrix M d (θ y) of order d associated with y and θ, has its rows and columns indexed by (x α ) and its (α, β)-entry is defined by:
One says that y = (y α ) ⊂ R has a representing measure supported on K if there is some finite Borel measure µ on K such that
For later use, write
. Equivalently, for some M > 0 the quadratic polynomial
Obviously Putinar's property implies compactness of K. However, notice that Putinar's property is not geometric but algebraic as it is related to the representation of K by the defining polynomials (g j )'s. Putinar's property holds if e.g. the level set {x : g j (x) ≥ 0} is compact for some j, or if all g j are affine (in which case K is a polytope). In case it is not satisfied and if for some M > 0, x 2 ≤ M whenever x ∈ K, then it suffices to add the redundant quadratic constraint g m+1 (x) := M − x 2 ≥ 0 to the definition of K. The importance of Putinar's property stems from the following result:
. Then y has a representing measure on K if and only if
We also have:
Lemma 2.3. Let K ⊂ R n be compact and let p, q continuous such that with q > 0 on K. Let M (K) be the set of finite Borel measures on K and let P (K) ⊂ M (K) be its subset of probability measures on K. Then
Similarly, (p/q)dµ ≥ ρ * dµ = ρ * . Other hand, with x * ∈ K a global minimizer of p/q on K, let µ := δ x * ∈ P (K) be the Dirac measure at x = x * . Then pdµ/ qdµ = p(x * )/q(x * ) = (p/q)dµ = ρ * , and therefore
Next, for every ϕ ∈ M (K) with qdϕ = 1, p dϕ ≥ ρ * q dϕ = ρ * , and so
Another way to see why this is true is throughout the following argument: the function µ →
is quasi-concave so that the optimal value of the minimization problem may be achieved on the boundary.
Minimizing a max of rational functions
Let K ⊂ R n be the basic semi-algebraic set
, and let
Consider the problem (3.2) P : ρ := inf
or, equivalently,
Assumption 3.1. q i > 0 for all x ∈ K and every i = 0, . . . , m.
Assumption 3.2. K satisfies Putinar's property.
With K ⊂ R n as in (3.1), let K ⊂ R n+1 be the basic semi algebraic set
and consider the new optimization problem
where M ( K) is the set of finite Borel measures on K.
Proposition 3.3. Let K ⊂ R n be as in (3.1) and let Assumption 3.1 hold.
the Dirac measure at (x, z) ∈ K. Then µ ∈ M ( K) and q 0 dµ = 1. In addition,
As ǫ > 0 was arbitrary, it follows that ρ ≤ ρ.
On the other hand, let µ ∈ M ( K) be such that q 0 dµ = 1. As
Integrating with respect to µ ∈ M ( K) yields (p 0 + zq 0 )dµ ≥ ρ q 0 dµ = ρ, which proves thatρ ≥ ρ, and so,ρ = ρ, the desired result.
We next describe how to solve P via a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations.
SDP-relaxations for solving P. If K is compact, and under Assumption 3.1, let (3.6)
and (3.7)
Redefine the set K to be Proof. By Assumption 3.2, K satisfies Putinar's property. Equivalently, the quadratic polynomial x → M − x 2 can be written in the form (2.3). Next,
and so consider quadratic polynomial
Obviously, its level set {x : w(x, z) ≥ 0} ⊂ R n+1 is compact and moreover, w can be written in the form
. Therefore K satisfies Putinar's property in Definition 2.1, the desired result.
We are now in position de define the hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations for solving P. Let y = (y α ) be a real sequence indexed in the monomial basis (
, and let v j := ⌈(deg h j )/2⌉ for every j = 0, . . . , m+ p + 2. For r ≥ r 0 := max j=0,...,p+m+1
v j , introduce the semidefinite program (3.10) Q r :
with optimal value denoted inf Q r (and min Q r if the infimum is attained). For a proof the reader is referred to §7.1. To solve (3.10) one may use e.g. the Matlab based public software GloptiPoly 3 [15] dedicated to solve the generalized problem of moments described in [20] . It is an extension of GloptiPoly [14] previously dedicated to solve polynomial optimization problems. A procedure for extracting optimal solutions is implemented in Gloptipoly when the rank condition (3.11) is satisfied. For more details the interested reader is referred to [15] and www.laas.fr/∼henrion/software/. Remark 3.6. If g j is affine for every j = 1, . . . , p and if p j is affine and q j ≡ 1 for every j = 0, . . . , m, then h j is affine for every j = 0, . . . , m. In this case it suffices to solve the single semidefinite relaxation Q 1 which is in fact a linear program. Indeed, for r = 1, y = (y 0 , (x, z), Y ) and
Then (3.10) reads 
For a player i, and a profile p, let p −i be the profile of the other players except i:
A profile p 0 is a Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies) if and only for all i ∈ N and all
This min-max problem is a particular instance of problem P in (3.2). Assumption 3.1 and 3.2 are satisfied and so Theorem 3.5 applies. That is, by solving the hierarchy of SDP-relaxations (3.10), one can approximate the value of the game as closely as desired. In addition, if (3.11) is satisfied at some relaxation Q r , then one obtains an optimal strategy. Since the optimal value is zero, one knows when the algorithm should stop and if it does not stop, one has a bound on payoffs so that one knows which epsilon-equilibrium is reached. 
We have solved the hierarchy of semidefinite programs (3.10) with GloptiPoly 3 [15] . For instance, the moment matrix M1(y) of the first SDP-relaxation Q1 reads M1(y) = 2 6 6 4 y0 y100 y010 y001 y100 y200 y010 y001 y010 y110 y020 y011 y001 y101 y011 y002 
With (a, b, c, d) = (0.05, 0.82, 0.56, 0.76), solving Q3 yields the optimal value 3.93.10
and the three optimal solutions (0, 0), (1, 1) and (0.57575, 0.94253). With randomly generated a, b, c, d ∈ [0, 1] we also obtained a very good approximation of the global optimum 0 and 3 optimal solutions in most cases with r = 3 (i.e. with moments or order 6 only) and sometimes r = 4.
We have also solved 2-player non-zero-sum p×q games with randomly generated reward matrices A, B ∈ R p×q and p, q ≤ 5. We could solve (5, 2) and (4, q) (with q ≤ 3) games exactly with the 4th (sometimes 3rd) SDP-relaxation, i.e. inf Q4 = O(10 −10 ) ≈ 0 and one extracts an optimal solution 1 . However, the size is relatively large and one is close to the limit of present public SDP-solvers like SeDuMi. Indeed, for a 2-player (5, 2) or (4, 3) game, Q3 has 923 variables and M3(y) ∈ R 84×84 , whereas Q4 has 3002 variables and M4(y) ∈ R 210×210 . For a (4, 4) game Q3 has 1715 variables and M3(y) ∈ R
120×120
and Q3 is still solvable, whereas Q4 has 6434 variables and M4(y) ∈ R 330×330 .
Another important concept in game theory is the min-max payoff v i , also called the individually rational level of player i. It plays an important role is the famous folk theorem (Aumann and Shapley [2] ). It is a min-max problem:
where
This problem is also a particular instance of problem P in (3.2). It seems more difficult to compute the min-max strategies compared to Nash equilibrium strategies because we do not know in advance the value of v i .
Note that in the case of two players, if the function g i (s i , p −i ) is linear in p then by remark 3.6 it suffices to solve the first relaxation Q 1 , a linear program. [23] extended the min-max theorem of Von Neuman on zero-sum games to any rational fraction of two multilinear extensions. His model and result may be extended to N -player games.
Loomis games. Loomis
Associates to each player i ∈ N two functions g i : S → R and f i : S → R where f i > 0. As above, their multilinear extensions to ∆ is also denoted by g i and f i .
Definition 4.2.
Loomis game is an euclidean game. The (pure) strategy set of player i is ∆ i with payoff function h i (p) =
1 In fact GloptiPoly 3 extracts all solutions because most SDP-solvers that one may call in GloptiPoly 3 (e.g. SeDuMi) use primal-dual interior points methods which find an optimal solution in the relative interior of the feasible set. In the present context of (3.10) this means that at an optimal solution y * , the moment matrix Mr(y * ) has maximum rank and its rank corresponds to the numbers of solutions.
Lemma 4.3 (Extension of Loomis [23] result). A Loomis game admits a (pure) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Note that each payoff function is quasi-concave in p i (and also quasi-convex so that it is a quasi-linear function). Actually, if
One may now apply Glicksberg's [12] theorem because the strategy sets are compact, convex, and the payoff functions are continuous.
Corollary 4.4. p 0 ∈ ∆ is a (pure) Nash equilibrium of a Loomis game if and only if
Proof. Clearly, p 0 ∈ ∆ is an equilibrium of the Loomis game if and only if
.
Using the quasi-linearity of the payoffs or Lemma 2.3, one deduces:
which is the desired result.
Again, this problem is a particular instance of problem P in (3.2) and so can be solved via the hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations (3.10).
4.3.
Finite absorbing games. This subclass of stochastic games have been introduced by Kohlberg [18] . A N -player finite absorbing games is defined as follows. As above, there are N finite sets (S 1 , ..., S N ). There are 2 × N -payoff functions g i : S → R and f i : S → R for each i ∈ {1, ..., N } and a probability transition function q :
The game is played in discrete time as follows. Inductively, at stage t = 1, 2, ..., players have to play simultaneously. A player i chooses at random an action s i t ∈ S i . Then, (i) with probability 1 − q s . We consider the λ-discounted game G (λ) (0 < λ < 1). If the payoff of player i at stage t is r i (t) then its λ-discounted payoff in the game is
Hence, a player is optimizing his expected λ-discounted payoff.
Let g i = g i × q and f i = f i × (1 − q) and extend g i , f i and q multilinearly to ∆. 
Proof. A consequence of Fink [11] .
Corollary 4.6. p 0 ∈ ∆ is a stationary equilibrium of the absorbing game if and only if
Or equivalently, iff p 0 is a Nash equilibrium of the Loomis game with payoff functions p →
A simple computation shows that p 0 ∈ ∆ is a stationary equilibrium with payoff w = w 1 , ..., w N ∈ R N if for every i ∈ N :
A calculus as in Loomis games shows the equivalence with the statement of the lemma.
Similarly, the min-max of a discounted absorbing game may be shown to satisfy the following formula:
Hence from (4.1) in Corollary 4.6, solving a finite absorbing game reduces to solving a problem P as defined in (3.2), which again can be solved via the hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations (3.10).
Zero-sum polynomial games
Let K 1 , K 2 ⊂ R n be two basic and closed semi-algebraic sets
Let P (K i ) be the set of Borel probability measures on K i , i = 1, 2, and consider the following min-max problem:
If K 1 and K 2 are compact, it is well-known that
that is, there exist µ * ∈ P (K 1 ) and ν * ∈ P (K 2 ) such that:
The probability measures µ * and ν * are the optimal strategies of players 1 and 2 respectively.
Semidefinite relaxations for P. With p ∈ R[x, z] as in (3.2), write
where d z is the total degree of p when seen as polynomial in R[z]. So, let p αβ := 0 for every β ∈ N n1 whenever |α| > d z .
Let r j := ⌈deg g j /2⌉, for every j = 1, . . . , m 1 , and consider the following semidefinite program:
where y is a finite sequence indexed in the canonical basis (x α ) of R[x] 2d . Denote by λ * d its optimal value. In fact, with h 0 ≡ 1 and p(y, ·) ∈ R[z] defined by:
the semidefinite program (5.7) has the equivalent formulation:
Observe that for any admissible solution (y, λ) and p(y, ·) as in (5.8),
Similarly, with p as in (3.2), write
where d x is the total degree of p when seen as polynomial in R[x]. So, letp αβ := 0 for every β ∈ N n2 whenever |α| > d x .
Let l k := ⌈deg h k /2⌉, for every k = 1, . . . , m 2 , and with
consider the following semidefinite program (with g 0 ≡ 1):
where y is a finite sequence indexed in the canonical basis (z α ) of R[z] 2d . Denote by γ * d its optimal value. In fact, (5.13) is the dual of the semidefinite program (5.7).
Observe that for any admissible solution (y, γ) andp(·, y) as in (5.12), (5.14) γ ≤ inf (5.9) , and suppose that with r := max j=1,...,m1 r j , the condition
holds at an optimal solution (y, λ, σ k ) of (5.7) . Then λ * d = J * and an optimal strategy for player 1 is a probability measure µ supported on s 1 points of K 1 .
(b) Let γ * d be the optimal value of the semidefinite program (5.13) , and suppose that with r := max k=1,...,m2 l k , the condition
holds at an optimal solution (y, γ, σ j ) of (5.13) . Then γ * d = J * and an optimal strategy for player 2 is a probability measure ν supported on s 2 points of K 2 .
For a proof the reader is referred to §7.2. 6. Zero-sum polynomial absorbing games As in the previous section, consider two compact basic semi-algebraic sets K 1 ⊂ R n1 , K 2 ⊂ R n2 and polynomials g, f and q :
Recall that P (K 1 ) (resp. P (K 2 )) denotes the set of probability measures on K 1 (resp. K 2 ). The absorbing game is played in discrete time as follows. At stage t = 1, 2, ... player 1 chooses at random x t ∈ K 1 (using some mixed action µ t ∈ P (K 1 )) and, simultaneously, Player 2 chooses at random y t ∈ K 2 (using some mixed action ν t ∈ P (K 2 )).
(i) with probability 1 − q (x t , y t ) the game is absorbed and player 1 receives f (x t , y t ) from that stage and forever (player 2 receives −f (x t , y t )), and (ii) with probability q (x t , y t ) player 2 receives at that stage g (x t , y t ) (player 2 receives −g (x t , y t )) and the interaction continues one step further (the situation is repeated at step t + 1).
If the stream of payoffs is r(t), t = 1, 2, ..., the λ-discounted-payoff of the game is
Let g = g × q and f = f × (1 − q) and extend g, f and q multilinearly to
Player 1 maximizes the expected discounted-payoff and player 2 minimizes that payoff. Using an extension of the Shapley operator [35] one can deduce that the game has a value v (λ) that uniquely satisfies,
Or equivalently, v (λ) is the unique real t such that 0 = max
Actually, the function s : R → R defined by:
is continuous, strictly decreasing and goes from +∞ to −∞ as t increases from −∞ to +∞. In the univariate case, if K 1 and K 2 are both real intervals (not necessarily compact), then evaluating s(t) for some fixed t can be done by solving a single semidefinite program; see Remark 5.4. Therefore, in this case, one may approximate the optimal value s * (= s(t * )) of the game by a dichotomy on t and so, the problem can be solved in a polynomial time. This extends Shah and Parrilo [34] .
7. Appendix 7.1. Proof of Theorem 3.5. We already know that inf Q r ≤ ρ for all r ≥ r 0 . Next, we need to prove that inf Q r > −∞ for sufficiently large r. Let m ′ := m+p+2. Recall that the quadratic module Q(h) ⊂ R[x, z] generated by the polynomials Let r ∈ N be fixed. As q > 0 on K, then q > δ on K for some scalar δ > 0. Therefore, by Theorem 2.2, q − δ ∈ Q(h). Similarly, there exists N such that N ± (x, z) α > 0 on K, for all α ∈ N n+1 with |α| ≤ 2r. Therefore by Theorem 2.2 the polynomial (x, z) → N ± (x, z) α belongs to Q(h). But there is even some l(r) such that q − δ ∈ Q l(r) (h) and (x, z) → N ± (x, z) α ∈ Q l(r) (h) for every |α| ≤ 2r. Of course we also have q−δ ∈ Q l (h) and (x, z) → N ±(x, z) α ∈ Q l (h) for every |α| ≤ 2r, whenever l ≥ l(r). Therefore, let us take l(r) ≥ r 0 , with r 0 ≥ max j=0,...,m ′ r j .
As
with deg σ 0 ≤ 2l(r) and deg σ j + deg h j ≤ 2l(r), for all j = 1, . . . , m ′ . Hence, for every feasible solution y of Q l(r) (and of Q l with l ≥ l(r)),
where the last inequality follows from M l(r) (y) 0 and
, for all j = 1, . . . , m ′ . Hence, for same reasons as above,
and so inf Q r > −∞ for sufficiently large r.
Next, from what precedes, and with k ∈ N arbitrary, let l(k) ≥ k be such that q − δ ∈ Q l(k) (h) and
for some N k . Let r ≥ l(r 0 ), and let y r be a nearly optimal solution of Q r with value
Fix k ∈ N. Notice that from (7.1), one has
with |α| ≤ 2k, ∀ r ≥ l(k).
Therefore, Complete each vector y r with zeros to make it an infinite bounded sequence in l ∞ , indexed in the canonical basis in u ∞ (x, z) of R[x, z]. In view of (7.3), one has y Next, let r ∈ N be fixed. From the pointwise convergence (7.5) we deduce that lim i→∞ M r (h j y ri ) = M r (h j y) 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , m ′ .
As r was arbitrary we obtain (7.6) M r (h j y) 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , m ′ ; r = 1, 2, . . . By Theorem 2.2(b), (7.6) implies that y is the sequence of moments of some finite measure µ with support contained in K. Next, from the pointwise convergence (7.5) and the constraints of Q r , one has 1 = lim i→∞ L y r i (q) = L y (q) = q dµ, that is, µ is a feasible solution of P in (3.5). Finally, the pointwise convergence (7.5) implies L y r i (h 0 ) → L y (h 0 ) = h 0 dµ (≤ ρ by (7.2)), we deduce that inf Q ri → ρ = h 0 dµ, and in fact the desired result inf Q r ↑ ρ, because the sequence {inf Q r } is monotone nondecreasing. The proof is omitted because it is exactly along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 3.5 as among the constraints of the feasible set, one has It has same degree as p(ŷ, ·), and by (7.7), p(ŷ, ·) − p(y di , ·) → 0 as i → ∞. Hence, sup z∈K2 p(y di , z) → ρ as i → ∞, and by construction of the semidefinite program (5.9), λ * di ≥ sup z∈K2 p(y di , z). Therefore, λ * di ≥ ρ− ǫ for all sufficiently large i (say d i ≥ d 
